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Abstract In this paper I interrelate productivity analysis
and the theory of industrial organization. A proposition
proves that an industrial organization is efficient if and only
if it is supportable in the entry-proofness sense. Industrial
performance is decomposed in efficiency and technical
change terms as well as an industrial organization com-
ponent. The performance measure is shown to be consistent
with the Solow residual and Malmquist productivity indi-
ces for its components are provided.
Keywords Scope (dis)economies  Industrial
organization  Efficiency  Aggregation  Productivity
JEL Classification L10  D24  O47
1 Introduction
In this paper I define benchmarking through a function that
maps two arguments, namely the object to be bench-
marked—a firm, represented by the pair of its input vector
and its output vector—and the backdrop against which it is
benchmarked—the industry—into a scalar, namely the
efficiency of the firm. The mapping summarizes a program
that identifies the best practice technologies or benchmarks
for the firm. The performance of a firm will be measured by
its output/input ratio or productivity—a concept that I will
connect explicitly to the aforementioned efficiency func-
tion. Aggregate performance may rise more than firm
performance scores suggest, if resources are better
allocated between firms. The excess is the industrial
organization effect.
Debreu (1951) recognized imperfections in economic
organization as a source of aggregate inefficiency and
Diewert (1983) analyzed them for open economies, focus-
sing on price distortions. I operationalize these ideas in an
activity analytic framework, but without using external
price information (such as the world prices an open econ-
omy faces), as Nesterenko and Zelenyuk (2007) do.
Another novelty is that my theory of benchmarking extends
my interrelationship of two value-based performance
measures—Diewert’s (1981) price index measurement and
Solow’s (1957) residual analysis—from the back-of-the-
envelope calculation for production functions (ten Raa
2005) to the activity framework.
There is more to the performance of a composite such as
an industry than micro or firm performance and composi-
tion effects. Blackorby and Russell (1999) and Briec et al.
(2003) have shown that things do not add up except under
restrictive conditions. Bartelsman and Doms’ (2000,
p. 571) understanding that ‘‘Aggregated productivity can
be computed as the share-weighted average of individual
productivity’’ is not exactly right. Indeed, Briec et al.
(2003, Proposition 5) and Fa¨re and Grosskopf (2004,
p. 108) noticed a bias, ten Raa (2005) related it to the
departure of the industrial efficiency condition that mar-
ginal productivities are equalized, and Balk (2009) shows
that in a growth accounting setting with independent
disaggregated price and quantity information differential
price changes add a term to aggregate productivity change.
I now proceed to interpret the bias as an industrial orga-
nization inefficiency measure.
A main contribution of this paper is the interrelation of
productivity analysis and the theory of industrial organi-
zation. A proposition proves that an industrial organization
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is efficient (in the sense of productivity analysis) if and
only if it is supportable in Sharkey and Telser’s (1978)
sense of being entry-proof.
The closest framework is that of Li and Ng (1995), who
distinguish technical efficiency, allocatively efficiency and
reallocative efficiency; the latter corresponds to my mea-
sure of industrial organization efficiency. They measure all
efficiencies using the shadow prices of the efficiency pro-
gram of the industry as a whole, while I employ the indi-
vidual firm shadow prices for the micro efficiencies and
show that departures between the two signal organizational
inefficiency.
2 Benchmarking: price analysis
Denote firm i’s input vector by xi = 0 and its output vector
by yi 6¼ 0; i ¼ 1; . . .; I.1 Input vectors have a common
dimension, output vectors have a common dimension, and
these two dimensions may differ (some positive integers).
For example, inputs can be labor, capital, and land, while
outputs may be numerous goods and services. Some
commodities can be both input and output. An industrial
organization can be represented by the allocation
ðxi; yiÞi¼1;...;I , which is denoted briefly by (X, Y). If I = 1,
the industrial organization is a monopoly; if I = 2, it is a
duopoly. If Y is a diagonal matrix, we have monopolistic
competition. If X is a row vector, we have an input price
taking industry, for which inputs can be aggregated to
‘cost.’ The efficiency of a firm is determined by bench-
marking its structure (xi, yi) against the industrial organi-
zation (X, Y). This is a comparison between the firm’s
actual output level and the best practice output level
achievable with its available input vector, just as Farrell’s
(1957) productive efficiency measurement technique and
Shephard’s (1970) output distance function. The idea is to
reallocate the input, xi, over all the activities j ¼ 1; . . .; I,
and to run the latter with intensities hj, as to inflate the










Program (1) assumes that activities (xi, yi) can be run
with constant returns to scale and that inputs and outputs
are freely disposable.3 Let ei optimize primal program (1).
The expanded yi=ei is the potential output of firm i, using
the best practice technologies. ei is a number between 0 and
1 which indicates the firm efficiency for firm i. The best
practice firms or benchmarks relevant to firm i are signalled
by hj [ 0 in program (1).
Denote the shadow prices of the constraints in (1) by wi




wxi : py j wx j; pyi ¼ 1; all j ð2Þ
This dual program is essentially the original tack to Data
Envelopment Analysis, taken by Charnes et al. (1979).5 The
connection between efficiency and valuations—a central
theme in this paper—is made by the main theorem of linear
programming. According to this theorem the primal and dual
programs have equal solution values:
1=ei ¼ wixi ð3Þ
Substituting the price normalization constraint of
program (2) in Eq. (3), the efficiency of firm i becomes:
ei ¼ piyi=wixi ð4Þ
This result establishes a connection between benchmark-
ing and price index measurement. The efficiency is the ratio
of the value of output to the value of input at shadow prices.
Georgescu-Roegen (1951) called it return to the dollar in a
more complicated framework, involving investment and not
necessarily shadow prices. Under constant returns to scale
the ratio should equal unity for profit maximizers. A perhaps
surprising feature is that the ratio is evaluated at private
prices, because the potential output of firm i has idiosyncratic
commodity proportions and because of the presence of
multiple inputs. For example, if the output mix of a firm is
relatively intensive in terms of some input, the shadow price
of that input will be high.
We now apply the apparatus to the efficiency of the
industry. The definition goes back to Farrell (1957) and
Førsund and Hjalmarsson (1979), who call it structural
efficiency. Related, Johansen (1972) defines potential
1 All I need are firms’ input and output data. This simplicity has a
price: I miss performance failures on the demand side. However, a
theoretical underpinning of this supply side approach is given in ten
Raa (2008), where it is demonstrated that my supply side efficiency
measure is conservative (in the sense of underestimating full
inefficiency) and sharp (attained by certain demand functions).
2 I do not surround the objective and constraints by the set symbol
{.}. I omit j ¼ 1; . . .; I under the summation model, following the
Einstein summation convention.
3 An obvious extension of this paper will be the generalization to
variable returns to scale, but this comes with integer problems (known
in the theory of contestable markets) that obscure the relationship
between the contestability and the efficiency of an industry revealed
and measured in the present paper. In other words, that generalization
better be relegated to a separate paper. Under constant returns to scale
output and input based benchmarking procedures are equivalent. The
program is linear in the nonnegative variables 1=e; hj.
4 The price normalization constraint features no slack, because the
non-negativity constraint for 1=e is non-binding (as 1=e ¼ 1 is
feasible by choice of hi = 1 and hj = 0, j = i).
5 Under the alternative scheme of input contraction, the dual would
maximize the value of output.
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industry output as a function of total input. Following Fa¨re
and Grosskopf’s (2004) extension, the idea is to reallocate
the combined inputs of all firms, industry input x =
P
xi,
as to inflate the aggregate output vector, y =
P
yi, by an
expansion factor 1=e. Under constant returns to scale the
industry technology is the cone spanned by the firm tech-
nologies, which is the same technology as the reference
technology in the firm efficiency program (1). Hence the
only modification to the latter is the replacement of firm











Let e solve program (5). It is a number between 0 and 1
which indicates the industry efficiency. The best practice
firms or benchmarks relevant to the industry are signalled
by hj [ 0 in program (5). Denote the shadow prices of the
constraints in program (5) by w and p, for the inputs and




w0x : p0y j w0x j; p0y ¼ 1; all j ð6Þ
Analogous to Eq. (3), potential output increases by the
following factor:
1=e ¼ wx ð7Þ
Analogous to Eq. (4), industry efficiency becomes:7
e ¼ py=wx ð8Þ
3 Industrial organization: an efficiency measure
Extending Briec et al. (2003, Proposition 5), Fa¨re and
Zelenyuk (2003, formula 2.12) and Fa¨re and Grosskopf
(2004, p. 108), Proposition 1 establishes a one-sided rela-
tionship between the efficiencies of the firms and the effi-
ciency of the industry.
Proposition 1 Industry efficiency is less than the market
share weighted harmonic mean of the firm efficiencies:
e 1=P siei, where si = pyi/py are the market shares eval-
uated at the prices determined by dual program (6).
Proof In the dual program (2), consider the socially
optimal prices p/pyi and w/pyi (which need not be privately
optimal). The denominator has been chosen as to fulfil the
price normalization constraint in program (2) and the
inequality constraint carries over from program (6). In
short, these prices are feasible with respect to program (2).
But by their suboptimality (in this private minimization
program), (w/pyi)xi C wixi or wxi  pyiwixi ¼ pyi=ei, using
Eq. (3). Summing and invoking Eq.(7) and the price
normalization constraint of (6), we obtain 1=e ¼ wx ¼
w
P
xi  P pyi=ei ¼P si=ei. Inverting, industry efficiency
becomes e 1=P siei. h
Extending Briec et al. (2003, p. 259), the next proposition
shows that the gap is zero if and only if the private prices of
the firms coincide. The sufficiency part is reminiscent of
Koopmans (1957) result that the industry profit function
equals the sum of the firm profit functions. Proposition 2
will be used later to show that an industrial organization is
efficient if and only if it features price competition and free
entry.
Recall the formal model: Firms are represented by
nonzero input-output activities ðxi; yiÞ; i ¼ 1; . . .; I, which
can be run with constant returns to scale and free dispos-
ability. Given these data program (1) determines the firm
efficiencies ei—with private shadow prices generated by
dual program (2)—and program (5) determines industry
efficiency e—and the dual of the latter is used to define the
market shares as in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 The industry efficiency equals the market
share weighted harmonic mean of the firm efficiencies if
and only if all relative private price vectors match.
Proof The private prices pi and wi solve program (2).
Rescale them by letting them solve min
p;w 0
wxi : py j 
wx j; py ¼ 1, all j (normalizing against y instead of yi). If the
relative price vectors are equal, i.e. (pi, wi) are collinear,
then, by the now common normalization constraint, (pi, wi)
are equal, say (p, w). I claim these prices solve program (6).
Feasibility carries over from any of the rescaled linear pro-
grams. Suppose the prices are not optimal. Then there would
be a superior ðp; wÞ with py j wx j; py ¼ 1 and
wx\wx. Hence wxi\wxi for some i. This contradicts that
(p, w) solves the rescaled dual program of that firm i. Since
(p, w) are also privately optimal, the inequalities in the Proof
of Proposition 1 are binding. The bindingness of the last of
these inequalities equates industry efficiency with the har-
monic mean of the firm efficiencies. Conversely, if this
equality holds, the inequalities in the Proof of Proposition 1
are binding. Hence p/pyi and w/pyi are privately optimal.
These private prices are collinear. h
Remark There may be corner/multiple solutions. For
example, If two firms each produce one unit of output with
one unit of labor and one unit of capital, then (X, Y) =
(xi, yi)i=1,2 = (((1, 1), 1), ((1, 1), 1)) and the private input
price vectors are (w1,w2) with nonnegative w1,w2 summing
6 I prime the variables in the program to avoid confusion with the
simple notation for the optimal values.
7 Since prices are in the numerator and the denominator of formula
(8), the price normalization in (6) is a wash: it yields no effect.
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to unity. The industry prices are the same, with the same
multiplicity. When there is multiplicity, the relative price
vectors are sets and Proposition 2 shows that if these sets
are equal industry efficiency equals mean firm efficiency
(and vice versa). I am grateful to a sharp referee for letting
me complete this point.
The reason that industry efficiency is generally less than
mean firm efficiency is that the industrial organization is
suboptimal. It is a form of allocative inefficiency. Firms
better be split or merged, specialize or diversify. This will
be discussed after the defining industrial organization
efficiency. The optimal industrial organization is deter-
mined by the benchmarks in program (5). Suboptimality is
signalled by a distortion between private and social prices
(Proposition 2). The efficiency of the industrial organiza-
tion can thus be measured by the ratio of the industry
efficiency to the mean firm efficiency, or, using Proposition
1:
Definition 1 The efficiency of an industrial organization,
(X, Y), equals eIO ¼ eP si=ei, where si are the market
shares evaluated at the prices determined by dual program
(6).
Definition 1 frees Nesterenko and Zelenyuk (2007)’s
definition of group revenue reallocative efficiency from its
price dependence. By Proposition 1 the efficiency of an
industrial organization is a number between 0 and 1, with
the latter value representing full efficiency according to
Proposition 2. Bogetoft and Wang (2005) explore the
potential efficiency gains of a better industrial organiza-
tion, including what they call the harmony effect. Five
simple examples show the measurability.
Examples
1. Consider an industry with equally efficient firms:
ei ¼ e. Then by Proposition 1, e 1=P siei ¼ e. Hence
industry efficiency is less than firm efficiency. The
efficiency of the industrial organization is eIO ¼ e=e.
2. Consider an industry that produces a single good from
labor and capital. Three firms each produce one unit of
output. Firm 1 uses just one unit of labor, firm 2 uses
just one unit of capital, and firm 3 uses 1/3 units of
both inputs. Since firm 1 has labor only, the technol-
ogies of firms 2 and 3 (which employ capital) are of
no use. There is no potential increase of its output. The
same conclusion holds for firm 2. Firm 3 could
reallocate its labor and capital to the technologies
employed by firms 1 and 2, respectively, but its output
would go down from 1 to 2/3. Hence no firm has scope
for an increase in output. All potential outputs are
equal to the observed outputs and, therefore, all firms
are 100% efficient. The industry, however, is not
efficient. If firms 1 and 2 would merge and adopt the
technology of firm 3, the new firm would be three
times as big as firm 3, hence produce three units of
output, which is one more than they produce using
their own technologies. Potential output is four units
(instead of three), so that the expansion factor is 4/3
and, therefore, the industry efficiency is 3/4 or only
75%. The efficiency of the industrial organization is
75/100 = 0.75 or 75%. The industry would do better if
the two specialized firms would merge. The shadow
prices differ indeed. The shadow input price of firm 1
is (1, 2). (Under this price firms 1 and 3 break even.)
The shadow input price of firm 2 is (2, 1).
3. It is straightforward to construct an example where the
industry would do better if a firm were split: Simply
substitute diseconomies of scope for the economies of
scope in Example 2, by letting firm 3 use 2/3 units of
both inputs (instead of the 1/3 in Example 2).
4. Add a fourth firm to Example 2, with the same inputs
as firm 3, but only 1/2 a unit of output. Clearly, firm 4
could produce a full unit of output (adopting the
technology of firm 3). Its efficiency is 50%. In the
present example, the outputs are 1, 1, 1, 0.5. The
market shares are 2/7, 2/7, 2/7, 1/7. The firm efficien-




1:00 þ 2=71:00 þ 2=71:00 þ 1=70:50Þ or 87:5%.
For the industry potential output is three for firms 1
and 2 jointly (see Example 2) and one for firms 3 and 4
each, hence five in total (instead of three and a half), so
that the expansion factor is 5/3.5 and, therefore, the
industry efficiency is 3.5/5 or only 70%. The efficiency
of the industrial organization is 70/87.5 = 0.8 or 80%.
5. Example 2 may also be varied as to have the price
variation on the output side. Consider an industry that
produces goods and services from a single input. Three
firms each use one unit of input. Firm 1 produces one
unit of the good, firm 2 produces one unit of the
service, and firm 3 produces 2/3 units of either output.
By the price normalization constraint in program (2),
firm 1 has a good price of 1. The input price is 1. The
service price must render the other two activities
unprofitable, hence be in the interval [0, 1/2]. For firm
2 the output prices are opposite.
Analogous to Nesterenko and Zelenyuk’s (2007, Prop-
osition 1) revenue property, an immediate consequence of
Definition 1 is the following.
Proposition 3 Industry efficiency is the product of
(market share weighted harmonic) mean firm efficiency and
the efficiency of the industrial organization.
Proposition 3 will enable us to refine the decomposition
of productivity growth in technical change and efficiency
288 J Prod Anal (2011) 36:285–292
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change in the next section, but first I make an observation
on the connection between the efficiency and the support-
ability of an industrial organization in a contestable market.
In a contestable market, a potential entrant can tap the
incumbents’ technology and the entry costs are zero; see
Baumol et al. (1982). Their solution concept is that of a
sustainable industrial organization. The definition of sus-
tainability involves demand conditions, but a simple,
necessary condition is Sharkey and Telser’s (1978) sup-
portability, and that is all I need.
Definition 2 An industrial organization (X, Y) is sup-
portable by price vector (p, w) if the latter renders every




j B xe, ye B
P
hjy
j, hj C 0)
wxe C pye).
The next result connects the benchmark industrial
organization involving price competition plus free entry
with efficient outcomes. In fact, Proposition 4 articulates
the Baumol and Fischer (1978, p. 461) intuition that ‘‘it
would be highly surprising if there were not a rough cor-
respondence between the most economical market form
and what actually occurs’’ and extends Baumol et al.
(1982) proposition that in a sustainable industry configu-
ration total industry cost must be minimized. In Proposition
4 full industrial organization efficiency means eIO ¼ 1
(Definition 1) and full firms efficiencies that the solutions
to all programs (1) are ei ¼ 1.
Proposition 4 An industrial organization is supportable if
and only if it is fully efficient and comprises fully efficient firms.
Proof Let me first prove the only if part, which is known,
at least for given input prices. So let the industrial orga-
nization be supportable by (p, w). I claim that the
normalized supporting prices p/pyi and w/pyi solve the dual
program of an incumbent firm, (2). For this purpose,
take hj = 1 and hk = 0,k = j in Definition 2. Then
xj B xe, ye B yj) wxe C pye. In particular, wxj C pyj.
(In fact, the inequality is binding by the first condition
in Definition 2.) This shows that the first constraint in (2) is
met. The second constraint is met by the normalization by
pyi. The value of the objective function in (2) must be at
least wxi C pyi according to the first constraint in (2) with
j = i. By the first condition in Definition 2 this lower
bound pyi is not exceeded by wxi of Definition 2, which
renders the latter optimal in (2).
By Eq. (4), firm i is fully efficient. Moreover, since the
relative prices solving dual program (2) are common to all
incumbent firms, Proposition 2 applies and the industry
efficiency is also 1. Substituting these findings in Definition
1, it follows that the industrial organization must be fully
efficient.
To prove the converse, consider a fully efficient
industrial organization comprising fully efficient firms.
By Proposition 2, there is a common price vector
(p, w) such that p/pyi and w/pyi are privately optimal.
I claim that (p, w) supports the industrial organization.
By Eq. (4), wxi = pyi. Let
P
hjx
j B xe and ye BP
hjy








where the middle inequality holds term by term in view of the
constraints in program (2) that characterizes the privately
optimal prices. h
4 Recovery of the Solow residual
Performance will be measured by the Solow (1957)
residual, the difference between the output and input
growth rates. Both growth rates are share-weighted
expressions, using competitive valuations. In a noncom-
petitive environment the residual captures not only tech-
nical but also efficiency change. Since the latter concept is
defined by the price-free benchmarking program (1), a little
work has to be done to make the connection. Introduce
time by subscripting inputs and outputs, as well as the
derived constructs, using the symbol t. Firm i has input and
output vectors xt
i and yit; i ¼ 1; . . .; I. By benchmarking,
yit=e
i
t is derived, the potential output of firm i . Its efficiency
is indicated by eit, a number between 0 and 1. As a







Technical change manifests itself as a shift of the
production possibility frontier. At each point of time, the
frontier is determined by the industrial organization (xt, yt).
Program (1) determines the efficiency of firm i as a
function of (xt
i, yt
i) and (Xt, Yt), say eit ¼ eðxit; yit; Xt; YtÞ.
Now the program that determines the efficiency of the
industry, (5), has precisely the same structure as that for the
firms (the only difference is that the pair of total input and
output vectors replace the role of a firm’s pair), hence the
same mapping e governs the relationship between the data
and industry efficiency: et ¼ eðxt; yt; Xt; YtÞÞ. Mapping
e has two arguments, the input-output pair that is
benchmarked, (xt
i, yt
i) in case of the firm, and the industry
constellation that determines the frontier, (Xt, Yt). Denote
the row vectors of the two respective partial derivatives of
8 The efficiency is the solution value to linear program (1), where the
data, the inputs and outputs of the firms, appear in the constraint
coefficients and bounds. The sensitivity with respect to the bounds is
given by the shadow prices (Jansen et al. 1997). The differentiability
need not be in the limited sense of functions but must be generalized
(Rockafellar 1980). The sensitivity with respect to the constraint
coefficients is differentiable (Freund 1985).
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the mapping by e1 and e2. By total differentiation, the
efficiency change of firm i is:
de
dt
ðxit; yit; Xt; YtÞ=eðxit; yit; Xt; YtÞ
¼ e1ðxit; yit; Xt; YtÞ
d
dt
ðxit; yitÞ=eðxit; yit; Xt; YtÞ
þ e2ðxit; yit; Xt; YtÞ
d
dt
ðXt; YtÞ=eðxit; yit; Xt; YtÞ
ð10Þ
The measurement of technical change involves a sign
issue. If firm i stays put—(xt
i, yt
i) = constant—but potential
output increases, there must be technical progress. Now an
increase in potential output, 1=eit, is equivalent to a
decrease in efficiency, eit. Hence a negative partial
derivative with respect to the second argument—which
captures the external effect—indicates technical progress.
Indeed, if a firm is fixed, but it becomes less efficient, it
must be that the benchmarks have moved out. In short,
technical change is measured by:
TCit ¼ e2ðxit; yit; Xt; YtÞ
d
dt
ðXt; YtÞ=eðxit; yit; Xt; YtÞ ð11Þ
Productivity growth of firm i ought to be defined
irrespective the shift of the production possibility frontier.
Productivity growth is defined by the effect of its own inputs
and outputs on the efficiency performance of the firm:
PGit ¼ e1ðxit; yit; Xt; YtÞ
d
dt
ðxit; yitÞ=eðxit; yit; Xt; YtÞ ð12Þ
This definition of productivity growth is essentially the
Solow residual, but because of its generality (the own effect
of a firm on its efficiency, keeping the environment constant)
this must be demonstrated. Now Solow (1957) defined his








t  wit ddt xit=witxit. His
prices are implicit in the partial derivatives of my efficiency
function. Proposition 5 makes it explicit, proving that
expression (12) equals the Solow residual.
Proposition 5 Productivity growth is measured by the
Solow residual: PGit ¼ pit ddtyit=pityit  wit ddtxit=witxit.
Proof The proof is by duality analysis. Mapping e’s first
(sub)argument, xt
i, lists the bound in program (1). The
partial derivative of the objective value, 1=eit, with respect
to this bound is the shadow price wt





¼ wit. Mapping e’s next (sub)argument, yti, is a coef-
ficient in program (1). Setting up the Lagrangian function
and application of the envelop theorem yields that the
partial derivative of the objective value, 1=eit, with respect
to coefficient yt





¼ pitð1=eitÞ. Substituting these in expression (12), we
obtain PGit ¼ witei2t ; piteit
 
d




t ¼ pit ddtyit=pityit  wit ddtxit=witxit, by the price normalization
constraint of program (2) and Eq. (4). h
Summarizing, efficiency change is defined by (9), tech-
nical change by (11), productivity growth by (12), and the
former two sum to the latter by Eq. (10), yielding Eq. (13):
PGit ¼ ECit þ TCit ð13Þ
Things look only slightly different at the level of the
industry. Now industry input and output, (xt, yt), are
benchmarked against the frontier. The productivity growth
of the industry is:
PGt ¼ e1ðxt; yt; Xt; YtÞ d
dt
ðxt; ytÞ=eðxt; yt; Xt; YtÞ ð14Þ
This expression is basically a summation of the firm
productivity growth rates, (12), with the modification that
private shadow prices have been replaced by social values.9
The price difference constitutes a wedge which is precisely
the aggregation bias uncovered by ten Raa (2005). I will
now explain the role of industrial organization in the
performance measure of productivity. Inspired by Caves




eðxitþ1; yitþ1; Xt; YtÞ













eðxit; yit; Xt; YtÞ

ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
eðxit; yit; Xt; YtÞ






eðxitþ1; yitþ1; Xtþ1; Ytþ1Þ
s
ð15Þ
where the second line decomposes it in efficiency change
and technical change. Similar to the firm index (15) the
industry Malmquist productivity index is:
Mt ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
eðxtþ1; ytþ1; Xt; YtÞ
eðxt; yt; Xt; YtÞ 
eðxtþ1; ytþ1; Xtþ1; Ytþ1Þ
eðxt; yt; Xtþ1; Ytþ1Þ
s
ð16Þ
Proposition 6 The Malmquist productivity index
aggregates the change in the efficiency of the industrial






sit=eðxit; yit; Xt; YtÞP
sitþ1=eðxitþ1; yitþ1; Xtþ1; Ytþ1Þ

ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
eðxt; yt; Xt; YtÞ
eðxt; yt; Xtþ1; Ytþ1Þ 
eðxtþ1; ytþ1; Xt; YtÞ
eðxtþ1; ytþ1; Xtþ1; Ytþ1Þ
s
9 Indeed, if the private and social prices would match, PGt ¼
e1ðxt; yt; Xt; YtÞ
P
d
dtðxit; yitÞ=eðxt; yt; Xt; YtÞ ¼
P
PGit eðxit; yit; Xt; YtÞ
=eðxt; yt; Xt; YtÞ.
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Proposition 6 decomposes productivity growth in
technical change and efficiency change and disaggregates
the latter to the level of firms. This disaggregation involves
a bias, which is accounted for by the industrial organization
effect. The first quotient measures the change in the
efficiency of the industrial organization. Firm efficiencies
are aggregated in the second quotient by the market share
weighted harmonic mean and market shares are evaluated
at the shadow prices of the industry efficiency program (5).
The square root measures technical change.10
Proof Apply the second line of formula (15) to the
industry and substitute, using Definition 1, eðxt; yt;
Xt; YtÞ ¼ eIOt =
P
sit=eðxit; yit; Xt; YtÞ and similar for e(xt?1,
yt?1, Xt, Yt). h
5 Illustration
Consider the Japanese banks (i ¼ 1; . . .; I ¼ 136) over a
five year period (t ¼ 1992; . . .; 1996).11 There are three
inputs (labor, capital, and funds from customers) and two
outputs (loans and other investments). Formally we have a
panel of inputs and outputs, (xt
i, yt
i). For the four transitions
between periods Thanh Le Phuoc has computed the
dynamic performance measure of productivity growth, and,
applying Proposition 3, its decomposition in the industrial
organization effect, firms efficiency change and technical
change. The results are in Table 1.12
The last column of Table 1 shows that total productivity
was initially stuck (0.08% growth in the period 1992–1993)
but climbed strongly (to 3.15% in the period 1995–1996);
on average it grew 1.17%. The bottom row decomposes
this figure in technical change, efficiency change and the
industrial organization effect. As usual, technical change is
the most important source of productivity growth, con-
tributing 0.85% per year. As is known from the growth
accounting literature, technical change can be negative—
see the second period. This means that the best practices
were worse than in the year before. This phenomenon is
natural in mining, but less so in banking. Tulkens and
Vanden Eeckaut (1995) redefine the frontier in terms of
current and past practices; this technique would force
technical change nonnegative and reduce efficiency
change. Efficiency change can be negative—see the first
period—but on average it augments technical change
(0.85%) with a quarter (0.21%). Industrial organization is
the third contributor to productivity growth, half the size of
efficiency change. Thus, on average, the industrial orga-
nization of Japanese banking improved in the 1990s, but as
for firms’s efficiency it can go up and down.
This is a diagnosis of the Japanese banking industry. I do
not explain the three components, but my hunch is that the
advances in electronic banking drove technical change and
the spread of ATMs enhanced efficiency. The industrial
organization remained sluggish, leaving scope for competi-
tive pressure, including changes in bankruptcy procedures.
6 Conclusion
An industry may perform better, in the sense of produc-
tivity growth, by technical progress or by efficiency
change. Both sources of growth have been decomposed in
firm contributions, but the aggregation is known to be
imperfect. The bias reflects the inefficiency of the indus-
trial organization. This paper offers measures for the latter.
Acknowledgments Author completed the paper at Bar-Ilan Uni-
versity and NYU Polytechnic Institute and the Berkley Center for
Entrepreneurship and Innovation at the Stern School of Business. I am
also grateful to Shawna Grosskopf and Sverre Kittelsen for literature
references, and two referees for detailed comments.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which per-
mits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Balk BM (2009) Measuring and relating aggregate and subaggregate
productivity change without neoclassical assumptions. Discus-
sion Paper 09026, Statistics Netherlands














1992–1993 0.07 -0.51 0.52 0.08
1993–1994 0.57 0.31 -0.58 0.29
1994–1995 -0.45 0.35 1.28 1.18
1995–1996 0.23 0.70 2.19 3.15
Total, annualized 0.11 0.21 0.85 1.17
10 Because Malmquist productivity indices are ratios near 1 (a growth
rate of 1% is an index of 1.01), we essentially have the sum of the
three effects. Proposition 6 frees Zelenyuk (2006)’s analysis from its
price dependence and the assumption of the Law of One Price.
11 Fukuyama and Weber (2002) kindly made available their data. The
data were obtained by extracting Nikkei’s data tape of bank financial
statements. Six banks had missing data and were excluded. These
were Akita Akebono, Bank of Tokyo, Hanwa, Hyogo, Midori, and
Taiheiyo.
12 When Malmquist indices and its components are properly reported as
fractions of the order 1, the product of the components equals total
productivity growth. When reported as percentages, the components sum
to total factor productivity growth, up to a first order Taylor approxi-
mation. This and rounding errors explain why not all row figures add.
J Prod Anal (2011) 36:285–292 291
123
Bartelsman EJ, Doms M (2000) Understanding productivity: lessons
from longitudinal microdata. J Econ Lit 38(3):569–94
Baumol WJ, Fischer D (1978) Cost-minimizing number of firms and
determination of industry structure. Quart J Econ 92(3):439–68
Baumol WJ, Panzar JC, Willig RD (1982) Contestable markets and
the theory of industry structure. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
New York
Blackorby C, Russell RR (1999) Aggregation of efficiency indices.
J Prod Anal 12(1):5–20
Bogetoft P, Wang D (2005) Estimating the potential gains from
mergers. J Prod Anal 23(2):145–71
Briec W, Dervaux B, Leleu H (2003) Aggregation of directional
distance functions and industrial efficiency. J Econ 79(3):237–61
Caves DW, Christensen LR, Diewert WE (1982) The economic
theory of index numbers and the measurement of input, output
and productivity. Econometrica 50(6):1393–1414
Charnes A, Cooper WW, Rhodes E (1978) Measuring the efficiency
of decision making units. Eur J Oper Res 2(6):429–44
Debreu G (1951) The coefficient of resource utilization. Econome-
trica 19(3):273–292
Diewert WE (1981) The economic theory of index numbers. In:
Deaton A (eds) Essays in the theory and measurement of
consumer behaviour in honour of Sir Richard Stone. Cambridge
University Press, London, pp 163–208
Diewert WE (1983) The measurement of waste within the production
sector of an open economy. Scand J Econ 85(2):159–79
Fa¨re R, Grosskopf S (2004) New directions: efficiency and produc-
tivity. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston
Fa¨re R, Zelenyuk V (2003) On aggregate Farrell efficiencies. Eur J
Oper Res 146:615–20
Fa¨re R, Grosskopf S, Lindgren B, Roos P (1994) Productivity
development in Swedish hospitals: a Malmquist output index
approach. In: Charnes A, Cooper W, Lewin AY, Seiford LM
(eds) Data envelopment analysis: theory, methodology and
applications. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, pp 253–72
Farrell MJ (1957) The measurement of production efficiency. J R Stat
Soc Ser A 120:253–78
Førsund FR, Hjalmarsson L (1979) Generalised Farrell measures of
efficiency: an application to milk processing in Swedish dairy
plants. Econ J 89:294–315
Freund RM (1985) Postoptimal analysis of a linear program under
simulataneous changes in matrix coefficients. Math Program
Study 24:1–13
Fukuyama H, Weber WL (2002) Estimating output allocative
efficiency and productivity change: application to Japanese
banks. Eur J Oper Res 137:177–190
Georgescu-Roegen N (1951) The aggregate linear production func-
tion and its applications to von Neumann’s economic model. In:
Koopmans T (eds) Activity analysis of production and alloca-
tion. Wiley, New York, pp 98–115
Jansen B, de Jong JJ, Roos C, Terlaky T (1997) Sensitivity analysis in
linear programming: just be careful! Eur J Oper Res 101:15–28
Johansen L (1972) Production functions. North-Holland, Amsterdam
Koopmans TC (1957) Three essays on the state of economic science.
McGraw-Hill, New York
Li SK, Ng YC (1995) Measuring the productive efficiency of a group
of firms. Int Adv Econ Res 1(4):377–90
Nesterenko V, Zelenyuk V (2007) Measuring potential gains from
reallocation of resources. J Prod Anal 28(1–2):107–16
Rockafellar RT (1980) Generalized directional derivatives and
subgradients of nonconvex functions. Can J Math 32(2):257–80
Sharkey WW, Telser LG (1978) Supportable cost functions for the
multiproduct firm. J Econ Theory 18:23–27
Shephard RW (1970) Theory of cost and production functions.
Princeton University Press, Princeton
Solow RM (1957) Technical change and the aggregate production
function. Rev Econ Stat 39(3):312–320
ten Raa T (2005) Aggregation of productivity indices: the allocative
efficiency correction. J Prod Anal 24(2):203–09
ten Raa T (2008) Debreu’s coefficient of resource utilization, the
Solow residual, and TFP: the connection by Leontief prefer-
ences. J Prod Anal 30:191–99
Tulkens H, Vanden Eeckaut P (1995) Non-parametric efficiency,
progress and regress measure for panel data: methodological
aspects. Eur J Oper Res 80:474–499
Zelenyuk V (2006) Aggregation of Malmquist productivity indexes.
Eur J Oper Res 174:1076–86
292 J Prod Anal (2011) 36:285–292
123
